

INHALTSVERZEICHNIS

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Bei normalen Täuschungen verträgt sich die Erwartung des Täuschers auf Erfolg nicht mit der Erwartung, daß der Täuschungsversuch auf Seiten des Täuschungsadressaten als solcher erkannt werden wird. Ist Täuschung überhaupt mit Offenheit (erwartetem bzw. gar intendiertem Erkenntwerden) verträglich? Bei nicht-normalen Täuschungen: Ja. Nicht-normale Täuschungen sind solche, bei denen der Täuscher nur dann mit einem Täuschungserfolg rechnen zu können glaubt, wenn ihm seine Täuschungs-Adressatin außer seiner Täuschungsabsicht auch noch einen Irrtum unterstellt. Wie sieht die Logik solcher Täuschungsversuche aus? Und was sind deren (psychologische) Grenzen?
- Richard SCHANZ: Pragmatismus zwischen Realismus und Antirealismus. Zur Wahrheitskonzeption von William James 19
William James's Konzeption der Wahrheit enthält sowohl realistische als auch antirealistische Elemente. Sie ist im wesentlichen das Resultat der Anwendung seiner pragmatischen Regel, des Kerns seiner Ansichten über Bedeutung, auf den Wahrheitsbegriff. James' vorrangiges Ziel ist es, die Theorie der Wahrheit und die Theorie der Erkenntnis in einen engeren Zusammenhang zu bringen, als dies im Rahmen der klassischen Korrespondenztheorie geschehen ist. Dabei gelangt er zu der bahnbrechenden epistemologischen Einsicht, daß es möglich ist, den Fallibilismus mit einer antiskeptischen Grundeinstellung zu verbinden. In seiner berechtigten Kritik am traditionellen Mythos der Gewißheit schießt James jedoch über das Ziel hinaus: Er verwandelt Wahrheit selbst in einen epistemischen Begriff und nimmt ihre damit zwangsläufig einhergehende Relativierung in Kauf. Dabei übersieht er, daß es durchaus möglich ist, den Fallibilismus mit einer absoluten Konzeption der Wahrheit zu verbinden.

<p>Gary W. LEVVIS: The So-called (and Actual!) Realism of the Tractatus</p> <p>David Pears's contention that the <i>Tractatus</i> is to be understood as advancing a form of metaphysical realism is defended against McGuinness's view that <i>Tractatus</i> 1-2.063 is to be treated just as introducing a metaphysical myth that may be employed to bring into prominence salient features of propositions. Starting with a discussion of the involved difficulties, e.g., determining (1) whether Wittgenstein does in fact provide an argument for the existence of simple objects (2) what this object is and (3) what role the existence of simple objects plays within the Picture Theory of the Proposition, Wittgenstein's argument for the existence of simple objects is reconstructed, augmenting Pears's existing account by providing further details of why Wittgenstein held that determinacy of sense requires the existence of simple objects.</p>	<p>45</p>
<p>Dieter STURMA: Reductionism in Exile? Herbert Feigl's Identity Theory and the Mind-Body Problem</p> <p>Feigl approaches philosophy of mind in the monist perspective of Logical Empiricism but he does not treat the mind-body problem in an eliminative manner. Although he modified his positions and wavered between strict reductionism and explicit non-reductionism, he never abandoned his conviction that the mind-body problem is not a pseudoproblem. Especially in his 'double-knowledge-view' he concedes private mental states that physical theory cannot account for and develops an identity theory that integrates two epistemic features – the way of immediate experience and the indirect way of knowledge-by-description. Feigl's complex treatment of the mind-body problem retains its systematical importance even in the light of later developments in philosophy of mind.</p>	<p>71</p>
<p>Aviezer TUCKER: Phenomenology, Explication, and Prescription in the Philosophical Meta-Disciplines</p> <p>In a meta-meta-disciplinary investigation the philosophical meta-disciplines (philosophy of science, of the social sciences, of historiography, psychology, literature, economics etc.) are discussed, distinguishing three types of inquiry among disciplines and meta-disciplines: phenomenology, explication and prescription. This taxonomy is applied to classify classical philosophy of science. Then the taxonomy is used to analyze meta-disciplinary mistakes generated by confusions between types of inquiries. Finally some examples for such mistaken confusions from the philosophy of historiography are discussed.</p>	<p>89</p>

<p>Francesco ORILIA & Achille C. VARZI: A Note on Analysis and Circular Definitions</p> <p>Analyses, in the simplest form assertions that aim to capture an intimate link between two concepts, are viewed since Russell's theory of definite descriptions as analyzing descriptions. Analysis therefore has to obey the laws governing definitions including some form of a Substitutivity Principle (SP). Once (SP) is accepted the road to the paradox of analysis is open. Popular reactions to the paradox involve the fundamental assumption (SV) that sentences differing only in containing an analysandum resp. an analysans express the same proposition, because analysandum and analysans are the same entity. Following suggestions of Gupta and Belnap it is argued that (SV) should be rejected.</p>	<p>107</p>
<p>Thomas L. CARSON & Paul K. MOSER: Relativism and Normative Nonrealism: Basing Morality on Rationality</p> <p>Normative nonrealism denies, first, that some things are good or bad independently of facts about the attitudes of moral agents and, second, that attitude-independent moral facts determine what is rational. This implies that facts about what is rational are logically prior to what is moral. Nonrealism commonly assumes (a) that moral realism is false or unjustifiable, (b) that there is a conceptual connection between morality and rationality and (c) that the particular theory of rationality is the correct account of rationality. Facing the threat of relativism when abandoning (c) it is argued that (c) is at least dubious. Semantic considerations concerning the meaning of "rationality" are sketched and the full-information approach of decision making, internalism and externalism are discussed in the light of "Why care?"-questions with the result that these questions do serious damage to nonrealist approaches to rationality and reason-based morality.</p>	<p>115</p>
<p>Rainer Werner TRAPP: The Golden Rule</p> <p>A thorough analysis of the Golden Rule (GR) is given including formal investigations of its logical structure and essential implications. Starting with the general distinction of positive and negative forms of GR a set of sixteen formal implications, one for each variant of the rule, is presented. The moral acceptability of the output of the different versions of GR is assessed in various problem contexts and in discussing several objections to GR with the conclusion that GR is hopelessly inadequate as a general criterion of moral choice.</p>	<p>139</p>