

INHALTSVERZEICHNIS

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Over the past fifteen years or so the distinction between <i>de dicto</i> and <i>de re</i> modality has been revived and pressed into service in a number of areas of philosophy. In "Plantinga on the <i>De Dicto/De Re</i> Distinction" it is argued that one prominent argument/persuasion advanced for making the distinction in the first place is unsound. The argument for making the distinction attempts to elicit rational acceptance of it by clearly illustrating it with a proposition that is false when modal-fied <i>de dicto</i> , true when modal-fied <i>de re</i> . However, if the example (and ones like it) is critically scrutinized, and the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions carefully adhered to, doubt can be cast on whether our intuitions regarding the case are really, at	

base, intuitions about a different and distinct form of modality, *de re* modality.

Joseph MARGOLIS: Thinking about Thinking

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The general claim of the present paper is that there may be a very large variety of ways of thinking quite different from one another, not actually in violation of formal canons of consistency, that may vary historically, from community to community or even from context to context. In particular it is argued that, given the present state of theorizing in cognitive science, it is unlikely that any defensible version of the Representational Theory of Mind could preclude a strong or emergent form of concept learning. An argument is presented showing that a Nativist reading of the theory is either undermined by the implications of its own assumptions or is formulably defective with respect to them in a way that may be impossible to remedy — or can only be secured by the fiat of denying this novel sort of concept learning. To account for the puzzles discussed in the paper a new approach to the analysis of thinking is suggested taking as its basis Wittgenstein's notion of 'forms of life' instead of the models favored in current conceptions of cognitive science.

Paul K. MOSER: Epistemic Coherentism and the Isolation Objection

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It is argued that a pure coherence theory of epistemic empirical justification fails to avoid an isolation objection according to which empirical justification has been divorced from one's total empirical evidence. Also, it is shown that several recent efforts to meet this objection either are outright failures or are irrelevant inasmuch as they diverge from epistemic coherentism. The overall moral is that we should look beyond coherentism for an adequate theory of epistemic empirical justification.

M. GLOUBERMAN: Cartesian Uncertainty: Descartes and Dummett

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For placing the contrast of certainty and uncertainty at the philosophical center, Descartes is charged with Michael Dummett with mistakenly subordinating the study of language and meaning to epistemology. But Dummett's knowledge-theoretic reading of the certainty/uncertainty duality is as erroneous as the tradition it inherits is long. The Cartesian demand for certainty and critique of uncertainty in mature writings like the *Meditations* has a definite semantic character. Cartesian uncertainty, construed aright, anti-

cipates Dummett's putatively original idea of a non-reductive yet non-realist semantics for standard factual claims asserted on the basis of sense-evidence. There is an internal relation, in Descartes' philosophy, between a repudiation of uncertainty and a repudiation of a non-realist conception of the world.

Heinz Dieter HECKMANN: Was sind Sinnesdaten? 125

Für die Sinnesdatenphilosophie sind zwei Behauptungen zentral: (1) Der sinnliche Gehalt des sinnlich-perzeptiven Bewußtseins ist gegenständlich oder objektual aufzufassen, d.h. es gibt Sinnesdaten oder phänomenale Gegenstände mit phänomenalen Beschaffenheiten; (2) Das sinnlich-perzeptive Bewußtsein ist nach dem Modell: Subjekt — zweistelliges Prädikat — Objekt zu analysieren, d.h. Sinnesdaten sind uns als Objekte unseres sinnlich-perzeptiven Bewußtseins unmittelbar gegeben. Die Annahmen (1) und (2) führen in philosophische Aporien. Es ist jedoch möglich, den sinnlichen Gehalt des sinnlich-perzeptiven Bewußtseins nicht-gegenständlich aufzufassen und nach einem Modell zu analysieren, welches eine solche Vergegenständlichung und die damit verbundenen Probleme vermeidet. Die sich gegen ein solches nicht-objektuales oder adverbiales Analysemodell erhebenden phänomenologischen und semantischen Einwände lassen sich entkräften.

Santiago RAMIREZ: Jean Cavaillès and the Vienna Circle 155

French epistemology of mathematics — Cavaillès, Lautman, Herbrand — took a critical position about the project for a theory of science stated by the Vienna Circle. The opportunity was provided by the International Congress of Philosophy of Science celebrated in Prague in 1936. The position taken by Cavaillès and Lautmann was surprisingly close to that taken by Tarski's introduction of semantics and to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. More specifically, to those parts of the *Tractatus* that were disqualified by Carnap. This criticism will be a part of what would later constitute "mathematical philosophy".

Kai NIELSEN: Counting the Costs of Equality 177

Conservative criticisms of egalitarianism are examined. Entitlement and desert based accounts of justice are assessed. Nisbet's, Nozick's and Flew's accounts, as paradigms of conservative views, are criticized and liberal egalitarian and radical egalitarian accounts of justice, in their responses to conservatism, are contrasted and a defense is provided for radical egalitarianism. A secure place for entitlements is found within an egalitarian frame-