

INHALTSVERZEICHNIS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abhandlungen	Articles
Preface	1
Rudolf HALLER: Science and Ethics Again	3
Knut Erik TRANØY: Science and Ethics, some of the Main Principles and Problems	11
Science can (also) be studied as responsible and rational human activity, guided and legitimated by its own <i>normative system</i> : a finite and ordered set of norms and values for agents in a given field of activity. Such <i>norms of inquiry</i> are needed for a <i>rationality requirement</i> of science, which also presupposes a partial agreement on (acceptance of, respect for) these norms between scientists and their social environment. The notions of scientific accountability, autonomy, and freedom of inquiry are elucidated by means of an action-theoretic definition of science and by a certain use of the distinction between <i>internal</i> (methodological) and <i>external</i> norms of science.	
Lorenz KRÜGER: Ethics According to the Nature in the Age of Evolutionary Thinking	25
It is argued that the opposition of nature and ethics ought to be overcome by the cooperation of scientific and ethical studies. Beyond that, theoretical, practical and specifically political reasons suggest a serious examination of the possibilities for an ethical orientation derived from evolutionary biology. So far, however, the conceptual connexion between evolutionary facts and ethical norms appears to be insufficiently understood. Given that, suggestive connexions offered by biological thinkers need critical examination, especially of their hidden historical conditions and their potentially dangerous political implications.	
Hilary PUTNAM: Scientific Liberty and Scientific Licence	43
There are old and convincing arguments for intellectual liberty in all of its forms — freedom to think, to speak, to publish — based on assumptions that we who have been brought up in Western democratic countries take for granted. Two major arguments are particularly powerful. The first I shall call the Utili-	

tarian argument which, in its simplest form, says that without intellectual liberty any Party and any government will harden into an exploiting class, a tyranny. The Kantian argument is that, quite apart from its value to society, intellectual liberty — Kant calls it autonomy — is absolutely indispensable to the integrity of the person. In this paper I defend the Kantian approach. The philosophical-epistemological question “How do you *know* autonomy is a good thing?” remains unanswered. No further foundation can be given.

Lars BERGSTRÖM: On the Value of Scientific Knowledge 53

Presumably, most scientists believe that scientific knowledge is intrinsically good, i.e. good in itself, apart from consequences. This doctrine should be rejected. The arguments which are usually given for it — e.g. by philosophers like W.D. Ross, R. Brandt, and W. Frankena — are quite inconclusive. In particular, it may be doubted whether knowledge is in fact desired for its own sake, and even if it is, this would not support the doctrine. However, the doctrine is open to counter-examples. The main counter-argument is that the doctrine has implications which are morally unacceptable.

Keith LEHRER: Science, Morality and the Prisoner's Dilemma 65

The problems that I address concern the morality and rationality of decisions with respect to the application and practice of science. Formally, the situation is a standard decision theoretic one in which one has a set of alternatives and a set of outcomes. The standard solution is to maximize expected utility. This formal simplicity conceals considerable philosophical complexity. The most obvious is — whose expected utility should we maximize? The second is — are there any moral constraints on what utility assignments we shall allow? The principle of rationality I am assuming is that a rational decision should be based on the total information available. Failure to cooperate in effecting such an amalgamation is subversive with respect to this overriding principle of rationality. It is a fundamental principle of truth seeking. Given the *prima facie* moral obligation to seek truth, failure to cooperate is *prima facie* immoral as well.

Myles BRAND: Interpersonal Practical Reasoning 77

According to one version of the Causal Theory, an action is a mental or bodily event caused by an intention to act. Deliberate action requires prior planning. The practical syllogism is inter-

preted as a summary description of the planning process, where the conclusion reports the agent's intention. Social action differs from individual action in that only the former requires coordination of one's action with members of a group. This difference is reflected in the intention with which we act, labeled 'we-intention' by Raimo Tuomela. Reports of we-intentions are the conclusions of interpersonal practical syllogisms. We-intentions differ from individual intentions both cognitively and conatively. The cognitive component of a we-intention includes a representation of the pattern of group activity into which one's action fits, as well as expectations of other's actions; the conative component includes at least one socially generated motive. These cognitive and conative components of we-intention find their explication in cognitive and motivational psychology and related fields.

Ivan SUPEK: Modern Humanism 97

The Humanism of the new era grew in a renaissance of hellenistic culture with the new trends in science and art coming into conflict with clerical dogmatism. Its decay has been caused by external factors (creation of national states and institutions) and by the internal development of science and philosophy; particularly the principle of objectivism separated science from ethics. The revival of humanism occurred in defense of the principles of equality, freedom and universality against the militancy and dogmatism of totalitarian parties. The danger of a total nuclear and ecological disaster has given to humanism the highest principle: the preservation of life. Humanism today is endowed by the mission to create the common basis for world-accord and -unity.

Mihailo MARKOVIĆ: Radical Democracy: A Rational Reconstruction 121

The elementary, liberal form of democracy has been criticized for being purely political, predominantly representative, centralistic, involving struggle for power among oligarchic political parties, maintaining professional politics and domination of wealthy classes. A more rational and radical form, the council democracy, is projected as a historically possible and better alternative. It extends democratic principles to economy and culture, combines direct participation with representation, replaces centralism with federalism, develops political pluralism without ruling parties, deprofessionalizes politics, and dismantles any monopoly of power. In the light of existing historical experiences

the structure of council-democracy is analyzed, possible solutions of crucial practical problems indicated, and different strategies of its realization are examined.

Eike-Henner W. KLUGE: Non-Naturalism Revisited; Rights/Obligations as Emergent Entities	139
---	-----

Ethical non-naturalism has traditionally identified ethical properties and relations such as rights and obligations as entities that are *sui generis* and apprehensible only to intuition. This is a mistake. A more fruitful approach is to identify rights/obligations as emergent entities that are ontologically not basic but derivative and that can be apprehended only using a conceptual framework that is sufficiently complex to mirror the logic of this emergence. This explanation allows a reconciliation of ethical realism, ethical nominalism and ethical non-cognitivism without falling prey to their respective shortcomings.