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Abhandlungen Articles

Alberto VOLTOLINI: Objects as Intentional and as Real 1

A theory of intentionality is outlined, in which the desideratum that the intentional be the same as the real object is argued for in terms of an anti-realist ontology. According to such an ontology, an ordinary object is in itself an object of discourse taken as intentional when posited phenomenologically and as possible when posited naturalistically, i.e. as not existing in some possible worlds but as existing in others. If the actual world is included among the latter, the object deserves to be called "real". *Qua* possible object, it answers to a principle of individuation which also works as a criterion of discrimination. According to such a principle, any possible object has a counterfactual individualising property which takes substance plus origin in a given spacetime as the object's essential properties, where it exists. It is, moreover, an object of discourse insofar as it generically depends, for its own being, on a singular term being publicly used to refer to it.

Albert NEWEN: Interpretation und Rekonstruktion der Ontologie in Wittgensteins *Tractatus* 33

Der *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* zeichnet sich durch eine eigenwillige Verbindung von logischem und physikalischem Atomismus aus. Der Zusammenhang von logischer und naturwissenschaftlicher Analyse wird bei Wittgenstein durch die Bildtheorie hergestellt und führt zu einem bildabhängigen Realismus. Diese Version des Realismus wird in einem Modell von physikalischen Eigenschaftspartikeln rekonstruiert. Die Gegenstände sind weder ‚bare particulars' ohne Eigenschaften noch Vektoren mit geometrischen Eigenschaften, sondern physikalische Partikel, die durch einen Vektor vollständig beschrieben werden können. In diesem Modell bekommen die Aussagen über den Zusammenhang von Sprache und Welt einen klaren Sinn.

Joseph AGASSI: Wittgenstein and Physicalism 67

In the light of a sketch of the history of modern Anti-Metaphysics up from Francis Bacon Wittgenstein's position – the refusal of the

possibility of metaphysical assertions – is compared with the views of Mach, of Carnap and Neurath and of Popper. Analysing the notions of 'nonsense', 'meaninglessness' and 'Scheinproblem', their interrelations and connections to physicalism three variants of Anti-Metaphysics are distinguished: the Enlightenment view, the positivist Machian view and the linguistic Wittgensteinian view. The present day actuality of these views is evaluated and the conclusion drawn that the model of the cooperation between the different intellectual activities is more promising than the proscription of metaphysics.

Ermanno BENCIVENGA: Empirical Private Languages and the Perfect Simulator 99

In an attempt at fleshing out the thesis that religious (and other similar) experiences cannot be attributed to an individual on the basis of outer behaviour alone, the hypothesis is entertained of somebody who decides, at a certain point in his life, to fool everybody into believing that he is a religious believer. This person, it is claimed, lacks the inner conviction that is crucial to religious experiences. Does this claim fall prey to Wittgenstein-like objections to the possibility of a private language? It is argued that it does not, by distinguishing between what counts *empirically*, and what *conceptually*, as a private language.

Klaus PUHL: Bedeutungsplatonismus und Regelfolgen 105

Die in PU § 199 formulierte These von der Mehrfachanwendung wird als Konsequenz der von Wittgenstein in seiner Diskussion des Regelfolgens geübten Kritik an der platonischen Hypostasierung der Normativität von Regeln (Bedeutungen) und damit ihres Meinens und Verstehens interpretiert. Am Beispiel der von Colin McGinn vertretenen *Gleichsetzung* des Verstehens mit einer Fähigkeit wird gezeigt, daß man, wenn man den Zusammenhang zwischen der Forderung der Mehrfachanwendung und der Kritik am Platonismus vernachlässigt, den *konstitutiven* Charakter des Verstehens voraussetzen muß. Die Abhängigkeit des Praxischarakters des Verstehens von der Falschheit des Platonismus und damit von der konstitutiven Lesart der These von der Mehrfachanwendung wird dann – am Beispiel Malcolms – für die Kritik der kommunalen Analyse des Regelfolgens fruchtbar gemacht. Die kommunale Analyse identifiziert zwei Positionen – die Frage eines sozial isolierten und die eines privaten Regelfolgens, die Wittgenstein in unveröffentlichten Manuskripten explizit auseinandergehalten hat und von denen nur die Möglichkeit eines privaten Regelfolgens den Platonismus voraussetzt. Wenn also die These der Mehrfachanwendung eine Konsequenz des Antiplatonismus ist, kann mit ihr noch nicht die Möglichkeit sozial isolierten Regelfolgens verworfen sein.

David SULLIVAN: Frege on Existential Propositions 127

Frege's advances in the development of quantification have rarely been subjected to historical interpretation. While the characterization of existence as a second-order concept awaited the invention of the *Begriffsschrift*, important philosophical innovations had taken place since Kant's critique of the ontological argument. In particular, Herbart had re-conceptualized the nature of existential judgement and this was recognized and adopted by Brentano. In this light, the possible influence of Herbart and Brentano (or their schools) upon Frege's work is elaborated and critically considered.

Philip HUGLY & Charles SAYWARD: Prior and Lorenzen on Quantification 151

Prior's theory of propositions is intended to be non-reductive and consistent with nominalism with regard to propositions while not requiring revisions of the truth-values of everyday propositional generalizations of which it is a theory. It is subject to this attack: (1) our everyday propositional quantification is not substitutional; (2) but Priorean quantification has to be constructed substitutionally; (3) thus Priorean quantification is not a correct rendering of our everyday propositional quantification. A defense of Prior is given by attacking (2). In this defense of Prior use is made of the account of quantification found in the writing of Paul Lorenzen.

B. H. SLATER: The Epsilon Calculus and its Applications 175

The paper presents and applies Hilbert's Epsilon Calculus, first describing its standard proof theory, and giving it an intensional semantics. These are contrasted with the proof theory of Fregean Predicate Logic, and the traditional (extensional) choice function semantics for the calculus. The semantics provided show that epsilon terms are referring terms in Donnellan's sense, enabling the symbolisation and validation of argument forms involving E-type pronouns, both in extensional and intensional contexts. By providing for transparency in intensional constructions they support a Model Conceptualism to contrast with traditional intensional logic's Modal Realism. But epsilon-terms also symbolise fictions, and through their difference from iota terms enable the solution of a number of outstanding puzzles about Direct Reference and *de re* beliefs.