

INHALTSVERZEICHNIS

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- Ronald E. BEANBLOSSOM: In Defense of Thomas Reid's Use of 'Suggestion' . . . . . 19  
Thomas Reid, the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher, was concerned with the proper use of ordinary language. P. G. Winch would have us believe that in spite of Reid's concern for observing the ordinary meaning of terms, Reid did not know the ordinary meaning of 'suggest'. Not knowing this ordinary meaning, Reid allegedly changed it in violation of his own criteria. Against this view I argue (1) Reid uses 'suggest' in a technical sense and gives reasons for doing so; (2) contrary to Winch's claim Reid does appropriately use 'suggestion' to describe perception.
- Roderick M. CHISHOLM: Individuation: Some Thomistic Questions and Answers . . . . . 25  
The epistemological problem of individuation concerns the conditions under which we can individuate or identify particular things. It is argued that these conditions presuppose that each of us can apprehend his own individual essence or haecceity. The metaphysical problem of individuation concerns the question: In virtue of what can it be said that two things which are counterparts of each other are two and not one? It is argued that here, too, we must appeal to the concept of an individual essence or haecceity. The views presented here seem to be in accord with those of St. Thomas Aquinas.
- David W. SMITH: Meinongian Objects . . . . . 43  
Meinong's object theory is primarily motivated by the needs of intentionality theory. I argue that Meinongian objects must be *intensional* entities if, as asked, they are to serve as the *objects of thought* in a purely object-theoretic account of intentionality. For Meinong, incomplete objects are the proper objects of

thought. Complete objects are beyond our grasp; we apprehend them as best we can when we intend incomplete objects embedded in them. This yields, on a semantic plane, an account of failures or substitutivity of identity in intentional contexts. And this, I argue, forces incomplete objects to be intensional, and so therefore are complete objects.

Terence PARSONS: A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects . . . 73

This paper explores the view that there are such things as (non-existent) fictional objects, and that we refer to such objects when we say things like "Sherlock Holmes is a fictional detective", or "Conan Doyle wrote about Sherlock Holmes". A theory of such objects is developed as a special application of a Meinongian Ontology.

Ronald SCALES: On Reference and Predication . . . . . 87

A theory of reference and predication in which denying that S is P is distinguished from predicating non-P of S is applied to the problem of denying existence. Proposed semantics for negative existence statements are special cases of general truth conditions for predicative statements and negation, undercutting ad hoc semantic analyses of the verb "to exist". Critical discussion of the views of Donnellan and Russell.

Ota WEINBERGER: Wissensaussage und die Unmöglichkeit ihrer Objektivierung . . . . . 101

Knowledge is expressed in sentences about states of affairs of the type '*p*', not in knowledge-sentences of the type '*W(p)*'. Knowledge-sentences are results of a reflexion about a subject of knowledge and a knowledge-system. Objectivization of a knowledge-sentence '*W(p)*' is defined as the entailment of '*p*' from the premis '*W(p)*' based on the generally accepted sentence '*W(p)→p*'. The author distinguishes three kinds of knowledge-sentences: a) self-reflective knowledge-sentences which are a result of the subject's *S* reflexion about his own knowledge '*W<sub>S</sub>\*(p)*'; b) comparative knowledge-sentences which are result of a reflexion of the subject *S*<sub>2</sub> about the knowledge of another subject *S*<sub>1</sub> using the knowledge of *S*<sub>2</sub> as a criterion for judging *S*<sub>1</sub>'s knowledge; c) the sentence of *S*<sub>2</sub> about the believing of *S*<sub>1</sub>, that *S*<sub>1</sub> knows *p*. In neither of these cases an objectivization is logically justified.

Keith LEHRER & Joseph RICHARD: Remembering Without Knowing 121

Memory sometimes yields knowledge and sometimes does not. It is, however, natural to suppose that if a man remembers that *p*, then he knows that *p* and formerly knew that *p*. Remembering

something is plausibly construed as a form of knowing something which one has not forgotten and which one knew previously. We argue, to the contrary, that this thesis is false. We present four counterexamples to the thesis that support a different analysis of remembering. We propose that a person remembers that  $p$  (at  $t$ ) if and only if the thought or conviction that  $p$  comes from memory (at  $t$ ) when, in fact, it is true that  $p$ .

Wilhelm K. ESSLER: Zur Topologie von Verstehen und Erklären . . . 127

Die Methodologien des Erklärens und Verstehens hängen miteinander zusammen: vom pragmatischen Standpunkt aus gesehen kann das Erklären als Operationalisierung des Verstehens aufgefaßt werden, sodaß das Verstehen damit den Charakter einer Disposition hat. — Den Arten des Verstehens entsprechen damit eindeutig Arten des Erklärens, von denen dann einige nach pragmatischen Gesichtspunkten weiterentwickelt werden. — Ein pragmatischer Gesichtspunkt ist es auch, der zur Unterscheidung von realen und irrealen Konditionalsätzen führt, wobei die Frage, welchen Wahrheitswert ein vorgegebener irrealer Konditionalsatz hat, von der Frage abhängig gemacht wird, in welchem deduktiven Zusammenhang er mit entsprechenden Naturgesetzen steht, die für seine Erklärung in Frage kommen; wegen dieses Zusammenhangs mit dem logischen Folgerungsbegriff sind sowohl irrealer Konditionalsätze als auch singuläre Kausalurteile als *meta-sprachliche* Urteile anzusehen.

Michael HOOKER: Descartes' Argument for the Claim that his Essence is to Think . . . . . 143

Two previous attempts to discern the argument Descartes intended to establish the claim that his essence is to think have failed to meet with success. I examine those arguments and offer an interpretation of my own that follows one of Descartes' strategies in the *cogito* passages. The suggested interpretation involves discarding every candidate that falls victim to hyperbolic doubt. However, while my strategy may have been intended by Descartes, it does not successfully yield his conclusion.

Ulrich MAJER & Rainer STUHLMANN-LAEISZ: Das Verhältnis von Mathematik und Metaphysik in Kants Theorie der Naturwissenschaft . . . . . 165

Der Beitrag der Mathematik zur Naturwissenschaft besteht darin, Erkenntnisse a priori von den (empirischen) Gegenständen der letzteren zu gewinnen und — unter der Voraussetzung, daß es überhaupt Empirisches gibt —, die Existenz solcher Gegenstände a priori zu sichern.